I. An Introduction to the Topic and the Contributors
For some time, I have thought it would be interesting to have a thematic issue of TAD that focused on intersections in the thought of Michael Polanyi and Charles Sanders Peirce. Not many scholars, other than the three writers included in this issue, have brought together Peirce and Polanyi. 1 Polanyians have frequently suggested to me that Peirce is an odd and difficult thinker, a charge to which I have more than once responded that the same is levied against Polanyi. I am delighted that David Agler, Vincent Colapietro and Robert Innis, all figures extraordinarily well prepared for the topic, agreed to contribute to this issue's discussion.
Vincent Colapietro and Robert Innis are seasoned scholars, some of whose writing has earlier been included in TAD. There was a provocative review, published more than 15 years ago in TAD 22 :3, Peirce and Polanyi to reflect upon the problem of the aesthetic intelligibility of the world in connection with an aesthetic approach to religious naturalism.
On November 17, 1990, Vincent Colapietro gave a paper at a Polanyi Society meeting in New Orleans titled "Lonergan and Polanyi: The Critical Appropriation of Intellectual Traditions." The essay was, in 1991, included in TAD 17:1 & 2, the first issue of TAD that I edited. The TAD 17:1 & 2 write-up about the essay says, "Colapietro examined the 'delicate' way that Polanyi and Lonergan treat 'the precarious authority of any particular tradition' as it plays its role in critical human inquiry," noting that the original paper evoked a lively discussion in New Orleans as the author "explored the problem of critical openness in 'the dialectic of fidelity and truth'" (4) . Some years later in 2002, Colapietro also was a respondent for another Polanyi Society annual meeting paper by Richard W. and that response was later in the 2009 TAD 36: 1 which included the Innis and Gulick essays. Colapietro's insightful essay in this issue argues that a primary preoccupation of both Peirce and Polanyi was to undertake (in the words of Peirce) an inquiry into inquiry; their accounts emphasize heuristic practices and show how theoretical pursuits are intimately bound to other shared practices.
David Agler, the author of "Peirce and Polanyi on Critical Method," is a promising young scholar. The first draft of his paper was presented at the Atlanta Polanyi Society meeting in 2009. This was a meeting devoted to papers by graduate students; the society issued a call for papers by graduate students interested in Polanyi, and Agler's proposal was one of six chosen. He subsequently revised and expanded his paper in light of discussions in Atlanta and comments from several readers, including Innis and Colapietro. Although he is young, David Agler is a seasoned Peirce reader who has become very interested in Polanyi. Before beginning his doctoral work, he worked at the Peirce Project and he has published an article in Transaction of the Peirce Society. Since presenting in Atlanta, Agler has finished his Ph.D (Colapietro was one of his mentors), and he will be teaching logic next year at Pennsylvania State University. As the title of his article in this issue suggests, this is a very careful and thorough essay which documents the parallel criticisms made by Charles Peirce and Polanyi against the "method of doubt" or "critical method" celebrated in much modern philosophy.
II. An Historiographical Note
At the same time that I became curious about possible links between Peirce and Polanyi's philosophical ideas, I became curious about whether Michael Polanyi might ever have taken any serious interest in Peirce. Peirce was another scientist philosopher about two generations older than Polanyi and an American, but certainly a figure deeply influenced by scientific practice and committed to the prosperity of science. I have read the archival correspondence between Polanyi and Marjorie Grene who is perhaps the figure Polanyi most relied upon for suggestions about what to study more carefully in Western philosophy. There is ample, forthrightly expressed direction from Grene-and some blunt Grene criticisms, if Polanyi resisted her advice-about many interesting thinkers, including Descartes, Merleau-Ponty, and Langer, but Peirce is never mentioned. There was a collection of Peirce essays and a book on Peirce and pragmatism among Polanyi's library books. 2 However, I have found only two places in Polanyi's writing where Peirce is cited, one in the important late essay "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading" and the other in Meaning. As I briefly note below, looking closely at these references only made me more puzzled. I suspect that these references imply that not Polanyi but his collaborators had some interest and knowledge of Peirce.
A. The Reference in "Sense-Giving and Sense Reading"
At the beginning of the section titled "The Triad of Tacit Knowledge" which immediately follows the introduction in Polanyi's "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading," there follows this paragraph:
Tacit knowing joins together three co-efficients. This triad is akin to the triad of Peirce: 'A stands for B to C'. But I shall prefer to write instead: A person A may make the word B mean the object C. Or else: The person A can integrate the word B into bearing on C. Tacit knowing joins together three coefficients. This triad is akin to the triad of Stoic logic: "A means B to C." But I shall prefer to write instead: A person A may make the word B mean the object C. Or else: The person A can integrate the word B into a bearing on C (402).
Despite following the German publication, the Acknowledgements of Intellect and Hope thank Philosophy for permission to reprint "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading" which it identifies as first having "appeared in the pages of this journal"(v). The early Gelwick Polanyi bibliography is also included in Intellect and Hope ("A Bibliography of Michael Polanyi's Social and Philosophical Writings," 432-446) and Gelwick identifies "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading" as an essay published in Philosophy (443). Finally, there is also a later German publication in Seminar: Die Hermeneutic und die Wissenschaften, Herausgegeben von Hans-Georg Gadamer und Gottfried Boehm (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 238, 1978) and the section in question follows the earlier Geman text and the essay is identified as a reprint of the earlier German publication (486). report that "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading" was originally a presentation prepared for the October, 1966 Eighth German Congress for Philosophy at Heidelberg which focused on language. Polanyi's presentation was an effort to extend his ideas about human use of language treated in Personal Knowledge and to address some questions raised by Chomsky. 3 Polanyi's presentation was later given again in English in the spring of 1967 at Cornell University and was used as a radio broadcast (presumably in German) by Hessian Radio in August, 1967. In sum, in one version of "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading," Polanyi's triad of tacit knowing is linked to Peirce's semiotic triad (object, sign, interpretant) but in another version which is published in the same year in German (not to mention a later American version) the link is with what is identified as the triad of Stoic logic. Perhaps Polanyi, given late stage advice by someone like Marjorie Grene (who frequently did edit Polanyi materials), changed the reference in the English publication, presumably because the comparison with Peirce seemed more appropriate. But this only raises the large question about how familiar whoever made the change was with Peirce and Peircean semiotics.
That is, one might question how "akin" Polanyi's triad of tacit knowing is to the semiotic triad of Peirce. I suspect that Peirceans might identify Polanyi's triad as describing what is sometimes called anthroposemiosis but is too narrow to describe the broader sort of semiosis (or sign process) that Peirce believed was at work in the cosmos. 4 Peirce certainly regarded human beings as knowers or interpreters-he even identified a person as a sign-but he saw human beings as in thought because they were immersed in the broader ongoing sign process of nature. Although I suspect Polanyi (or perhaps a well-intentioned editor) was not thoroughly familiar with Peirce's semiotics, if he/she had been, he/she might have been intrigued by Peirce's effort to situate human knowing in a larger, changing cosmic context with his semiotic framework; Polanyi's own broader philosophical vision-as seen, for example, in Part IV of PK or the end of TD-moves in just this direction.
B. The Reference to Peirce in Meaning
The second reference to Peirce comes in the eleventh chapter of Meaning whose title is "Order." At the beginning of "Order," Polanyi and Prosch point out that human beings today generally think the world is orderly but pointless. There is no meaning in the world except subjective meanings that human beings import into the world. Such subjective meaning-making is regarded as like building sand castles at the edge of the sea. Polanyi and Prosch conclude that "Intellectual assent to the reduction of the world to its atomic elements acting blindly in terms of equilibrations of forces, an assent that has gradually come to prevail since the birth of modern science, has made any sort of teleological view of the cosmos seem unscientific and woolgathering to us" (M 162). They note the abhorrence of teleology in even non-scientific existentialist thought and assert that particularly strong today is the rejection of any sort of tightly deterministic account of the universe in terms of structuring by an overriding cosmic purpose. But then Polanyi and Prosch turn briefly to some thinkers who they suggest successfully argue for a "looser view of teleology":
However, since at least the time of Charles Saunders Peirce and William James a looser view of teleology has been offered to us-one that would make it possible for us to suppose that some sort of intelligible directional tendencies may be operative in the world without our having to suppose that they determine things (M 162).
There is a footnote following this sentence and it cites four specific sets of paragraphs in the eight volume Collected Papers edition of Peirce materials (the standard definitive texts at the time) as well as three different specific sections from James' A Pluralistic Universe! 5 I have looked at the cited paragraphs in Peirce's Collected Papers and it is easy enough to see why these passages were construed as suggesting a "looser view of teleology." This is rich set of references sketching Peirce's ideas about habit, the evolution of the laws of nature, the nature and importance of chance (or spontaneity) and continuity in the universe, Peirce's analysis of Darwian, Lamarckian, and Spencerian views, (as well as what we today would call punctuated evolution), and Peirce's metaphysical categories and the way they can be used to fashion a cosmogonic philosophy. I conclude that the content of this footnote to Peirce implies a rather sophisticated understanding of Peirce's thought and the recognition that Peirce's effort to recover teleology is akin to some of the ideas developed in Polanyi's thought and particularly in Meaning. But I also think that this footnote does not reflect that Polanyi deeply appreciated Peirce but that Harry Prosch did and saw connections with ideas Polanyi was struggling to articulate. 6 scrambled, although it uses the standard way of referencing the Collected Papers by volume and paragraph (e.g., 6.13-24). There is a specifically cited Peirce paragraph and then a longer passage cited following in parentheses and these double citations (there are four pairs) are separated by commas. In some cases, the first citation in a pair is simply a subsection of the longer passage cited in the parenthesis. But in two cases the first citation is not a subsection of the section cited in parenthesis. It is also almost certainly the case that there is a typographical error in the first citation-which cites the volume-of a specific passage because the reference is to the seventh rather than the sixth volume of the Collected Papers. Tracking what is going on in the footnote is very challenging. On the assumption that this might not be a typographical error, I have looked at the passages in the seventh volume (as well as those in the sixth, if the citation should have been to the sixth) and the sections in the seventh volume treat topics like Peirce's pendulum research and a psychological experiment. It does not make much sense to me to cite these numbered paragraphs in volume 7 and thus
